XIX.—The Moods in Indirect Discourse in Latin [1]

E. ADELAIDE HAHN

HUNTER COLLEGE

The highly organized and complicated system of indirect discourse developed in Latin is a thing *sui generis*. The Greek system, with its vastly greater freedom and subtlety, must have been an independent development; and I know of nothing at all comparable

[1] Bibliographical references are to be interpreted as follows. Allen-Greenough = *Allen and Greenough's New Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges*, ed. by J. B. Greenough, G. L. Kittredge, A. A. Howard, and Benjamin L. D'Ooge; Boston, 1903. *Ann. dell'inst.* = *Annali dell'instituto di corrispondenza archeologica*. Antoine = F. Antoine, "L'Attraction modale en latin," *Mélanges Boissier* 25–35; Paris, 1903. Becker = Eduardus Becker, *De Syntaxi Interrogationum obliquarum apud priscos Scriptores latinos* = *Studien auf dem Gebiete des archaischen Lateins* 1, ed. by Wilhelm Studemund; Berlin, 1873. Bennett = Charles E. Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin*; 2 vols.; Boston, 1910–4 (all references are to vol. 1, *The Verb*). Blase = Heinrich Blase, "Tempora und Modi," *Historische Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache* 3.97–312, ed. by Gustav Landgraf; Leipzig, 1903. Bräunlich = Alice Freda Bräunlich, *The Indicative Indirect Question in Latin*; Chicago, 1920. Conway = *Livy Book II*, ed. by R. S. Conway; Cambridge, 1902. Delbrück = B. Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen* = *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen* 3–5; 3 vols.; Strassburg, 1893–1900 (all references are to vol. 3 = *Grundriss* 5). Ernout and Thomas = Alfred Ernout and François Thomas, *Syntaxe latine*; Paris, 1951. Frank = Tenney Frank, *Attraction of Mood in Early Latin*; Chicago, 1904. Hahn = E. Adelaide Hahn, *Subjunctive and Optative: Thier Origin as Futures*; New York, 1953. Hale = Wm. Gardner Hale, "The Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin," *Studies in Classical Philology* 1.3–92; Chicago, 1895 (preprint dated 1894). Hale and Buck = William Gardner Hale and Carl Darling Buck, *A Latin Grammar*; Boston, 1903. Handford = S. A. Handford, *The Latin Subjunctive*; London, 1947. Hofmann = Manu Leumann and Joh. Bapt. Hofmann, *Stolz-Schmalz Lateinische Grammatik*; 5th edition; Munich, 1928. Lebreton = Jules Lebreton, *Études sur la langue et la grammaire de Cicéron*; Paris, 1901. Lindsay = W. M. Lindsay, *Syntax of Plautus*; Oxford, 1907. Lodge = Gonzalez Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum*; 2 vols.; Leipzig, 1904–33. Morris = *The Captives and Trinummus of Plautus*, ed. by E. P. Morris; Boston, 1899. Nixon = *Plautus*, tr. by Paul Nixon; 5 vols.; London, 1921–38. Oliver = Revilo P. Oliver, "Petrarch's Prestige as a Humanist," *Classical Studies in Honor of William Abbott Oldfather* 134–53; Urbana, 1943. Ribbeck = *Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, ed. by Otto Ribbeck = *Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta* 1; 3rd edition; Leipzig, 1897. Sjögren = H. Sjögren, *Zum Gebrauch des Futurums im Alllateinischen* = *Skrifter utgifna af Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala* 9.5; Uppsala, 1906. Thomas = François Thomas, *Recherches sur le subjonctif latin*; Paris, 1938. Warmington = *Remains of Old Latin*, ed. and tr. by E. H. Warmington; 4 vols.; Cambridge and London, 1935–40. — References are to pages unless there is indication to the contrary. Latin citations are to Plautus or Terence unless some other author is specified. Quotations are not

in any of the other Indo-European languages. We can see the Latin pattern in the process of evolving, since it was by no means so fixed in early Latin as in the classical period; yet satisfactory explanations of this evolution have not been found for all its features. It is the purpose of this paper to account, or at least to try to account, for the moods that finally became stabilized in indirect discourse. I am not concerned with special and self-evident means for adding certain refinements, as the use of the infinitive in a relative clause when the latter is not really subordinate, or of the indicative in a dependent clause when the latter is not really a part of the quotation; I am concerned with the *salient* features of the construction, the use in main clauses of the infinitive in quoted statements, and the subjunctive in quoted commands and questions,[2] and the use in subordinate clauses of the subjunctive everywhere.

I

The genesis of the infinitive with subject-accusative in main clauses depending on *verba dicendi et sentiendi* I have tried to trace in an earlier article.[3] I attribute it to a misinterpretation, as an infinitive without a copula, of a past or future participle in predicative agreement with an accusative substantive. Thus Plautus probably thought — or would have thought had he given the matter any consideration at all — that when he wrote (*Pers.* 391) te indotatam dicas, or (*As.* 356) ego me dixi erum adducturum, he

necessarily complete; they give enough words to make clear the sense and the syntax, usually with no indication of omissions. A dash separating parts of a quotation denotes a change of speaker.

[2] Under the head of quoted commands, I make no distinction between clauses containing the so-called subjunctive developed from the volitive (less well termed substantive purpose clauses), as Caesar, *Bell. Gall.* 1.28.3 Allobrogibus imperavit ut his frumenti copiam facerent; and the so-called commands in indirect discourse, as *ib.* 1.36.1 . . . 7 respondit . . . cum vellet, congrederetur. I do not distinguish from commands other imperative usages, such as requests, permissions, etc. (cf. Bennett 351–4). Under the head of quoted questions, I make no distinction between the so-called indirect questions, as Cicero, *Cat.* 2.6.13 quaesivi quid dubitaret; and the so-called questions in indirect discourse, as Caesar, *Bell. Gall.* 1.44.1 . . . 8 respondit. . . . quid sibi vellet.

[3] *TAPA* 81.117–29. In this article I stress the necessity of separating the construction with verbs of this type from the same construction with verbs of ordering and permitting. I disagree with those who would derive *video hunc venire* or *dico hunc venire* from *iubeo hunc venire*. In that case we would have not a quoted statement but a quoted command, which in Latin is not *dico hunc venire* but *dico huic veniat*.

was using an infinitive[4] quite as much as when he wrote (*Men.* 1097) te Syracusis natum esse dixisti; and similarly when he employed a predicate noun or adjective, it made no difference whether *esse* was absent, as in *Trin.* 740 dicant te benignum, or present, as in *As.* 352 dico med esse atriensem.   Yet in my opinion in the earliest appearance of the construction, such adjective forms as *indotatam*, *adducturum*, and *benignum* would all have been in direct agreement with *te*, *me*, and *te* respectively, and there could have been no question of any *esse*, expressed or "understood."   Once the *esse* entered the picture, and the infinitive came to be the norm, whether in the form of the copula, the past passive, or the future active, then analogy would easily add other forms of the infinitive, namely, the present, both active and passive, of other verbs beside "be," the past active, and the rare future passive; and the construction was established.

II

The employment of the subjunctive in quoted commands presents no difficulties, since we can easily trace its origin to the usage in direct discourse.   Here alike in affirmative commands or requests and in prohibitions, two moods function, the imperative and the subjunctive.   Both imperative and subjunctive occur very frequently in paratactic combinations with a verb of asking or bidding. We may cite a few typical examples.

Imperative Affirmative

Men. 696–7 tibi dico mane redi
Bacch. 744 quaeso cave
Amph. 1097 quaeso absolvito
Cist. 764–5 obsecro exquaeritote

Imperative Negative

Heaut. 1052 age quaeso ne offirma te
As. 417 quaeso hercle noli hunc verberare

Subjunctive Affirmative

Poen. 1155–6 dico tuam mihi filiam despondeas
Mil. 1341 bene quaeso inter vos dicatis
Men. 1073 quaeso ignoscas
Aul. 715–6 obsecro vos mi auxilio sitis
Truc. 839 eloquere haec erae puerum reddat

---

[4] Indeed, there is clear proof that for him *adducturum* stands for *adducturum esse*, since he adds a coordinate clause with an infinitive, et me domi praesto fore.

Subjunctive Negative

And. 204–5 dico tibi ne temere facias
Heaut. 291–2 obsecro ne me conicias
Epid. 164–5 dicam ne hinc foras exambulet
Aul. 210 quaeso ne id te pigeat proloqui

Such instances pave the way for the hypotactic construction; indeed, some of those here cited may be regarded as already exemplifying it.

Imperatives are used as absolute parallels for subjunctives: cf. e.g. *Rud.* 867 obsecro te subveni mi and *Hec.* 721 te oro adiutor sis mihi.[5]   However, in the fully developed hypotactic construction, the only indubitable survival of the imperative known to me is presented by the stereotyped and petrified combinations with *dico* of *vale*, *salve*, and *ave*, as in Servius on *Aen.* 11.97 Varro dicit mortuis salve et vale dici, and Caelius *ap.* Cicero, *Fam.* 8.16.4 simul atque ave mihi dixit, statim quid de te audisset exposuit. These can hardly be viewed as direct quotations, which would demand *inquam* rather than *dico* (as in *Capt.* 479 salvete inquam). But neither are they genuine examples of indirect quotations, since not only the tense[6] and the person of the imperative remain invariable, as is inevitable, but the number as well.[7]   Certainly the singular was used in the direct discourse in both the passages cited, the first no less than the second, since the farewell is addressed to each dead person separately, not to a group of dead collectively; but in indirect discourse had the subjunctive been used instead of the imperative, the presence of *mortuis* would certainly have induced a shift to the plural, and we would have had Varro dicit mortuis salveant et valeant dici.[8]   The true explanation is of course that in these conventional phrases the imperative has ceased to be felt as such, as is further proved by the fact that it can be co-

---

[5] Possibly a survival of the double construction is to be found as late as Lucretius, whose *concede necessest* (3.962) seems no more necessarily an example of pure parataxis than his *fateare necessest* (3.470).

[6] Note that the second of the two passages cited is in historical sequence, and contrast the present imperative *ave* with the pluperfect subjunctive *audisset*.

[7] I know of no instance of a shift to the plural in classical Latin, though we do find one in the *Vulgate*, Matthew 28:9 Jesus occurrit illis dicens avete.

[8] The regular idiom, however, would be rather *mortuos salvere et valere iuberi*. A peculiar variant of this normal use of *iubeo valere*, doubtless resulting from contamination, is Suetonius' use of *dico valere*, as in *Aug.* 53, *Tib.* 72, *Galb.* 4.

ordinated with a noun,[9] modified by an adjective,[10] combined with a participle to form an ablative absolute,[11] or used as object of a verb other than *dico*.[12]

Apart from this one aberrant type of imperative usage,[13] and possibly one or two other petrified forms,[14] we find everywhere in indirect commands only the subjunctive.

The triumph of the subjunctive over the imperative is easily to be accounted for by its far greater frequency and its far greater efficiency. (1) While the speaker in uttering his command or prohibition had a choice between subjunctive and imperative in the second person, he was practically limited to the subjunctive in the third person, since this person is totally lacking in the "present" imperative and is almost exclusively confined to legal language in the "future" imperative.[15] (2) In prohibitions with *ne* the mood normally used was the subjunctive (either present or perfect); the imperative is largely restricted to short formulaic expressions[16] of durative aspect,[17] such as *ne time, ne fle*.[18] (3) In addition to these

---

[9] As in Martial 7.39.2–3 et fastus et ave potentiorum cum perferre patique iam negaret.

[10] As in Ovid, *Her*. 13.14 vix illud potui dicere triste vale.

[11] As in Ovid, *Trist*. 1.3.57 saepe vale dicto rursus sum multa locutus.

[12] As in Martial 3.95.1 numquam dicis ave sed reddis, Naevole, semper. So, too, in 7.39.2–3 (cited in note 9).

[13] For additional examples and further details in regard to the locution, see my discussion, *TAPA* 78.331–2.

[14] Namely, verbs of the type *calefacio*, and adverbs of the type *videlicet*. See Hahn, *TAPA* 78.301–35 and 79.308–37 respectively.

[15] See Hofmann 576.

[16] Cf. Bennett 362.

[17] Cf. Ernout and Thomas 197, on the imperative with *ne*: "il s'applique de préférence à une action déjà commencée, à un sentiment que l'on éprouve déjà lorsque la défense est formulée."

[18] To be sure, the imperative is also met in the prohibitions that are expressed periphrastically with the idea of negation conveyed by the meaning of the main verb, usually *noli* (the regular classical mode of expression but comparatively rare in early Latin; for statistics see Bennett 362–4) or *cave*. Thus beside a very old lamp with the inscription *ne at(t)igas*, we find a somewhat later one with the inscription *noli me tanger(e)* (for descriptions and dates, see Dressel, *Ann. dell'inst.* 52.266–7 and 340–1). Plautus can use either such a construction as *ne time* (*Amph.* 674 et al.) and *ne fle* (*Capt.* 139 et al.), or, though much less often, such a construction as *noli metuere* (*Truc.* 674) and *noli flere* (*Pers.* 622). Terence has *ne saevi* (*And.* 868); Plautus has *noli irasci* (*Amph.* 540), *cave iratus fuas* (*Capt.* 431), *caveto ne suscenseas* (*As.* 372). However, these periphrases constitute a special type which does not seem to have entered to any appreciable degree into *oratio obliqua*. To be sure, they, like other imperatives (as already noted), are frequently combined in early Latin with verbs of asking and

two advantages which the subjective possessed over the im-
perative even in direct discourse, it had still a third in indirect dis-
course, namely, that as the extensive Latin development of the
system of sequence of tenses took place, only the subjunctive be-
came possible when the main verb was in one of the historical
tenses, since it had an imperfect tense to balance the present,
which the imperative wholly lacked.[19]

bidding.   Often the word-order seems to indicate parataxis, as in *Cist.* 58 noli obsecro
imperare, *Merc.* 934 noli quaeso dicere, *Aul.* 618 cave tu illi fidelis quaeso potius fueris
quam mihi; but elsewhere it is at least possible to view the passage as an instance of
hypotaxis, as *As.* 417 quaeso noli hunc verberare (already cited), *Curc.* 697 obsecro
te noli hunc perdere.   In *Capt.* 430–1 animum advortas volo atque cave mi iratus
fuas, the subjunctive *advortas* certainly seems to depend on *volo*, and the imperative
cave to be coordinate with *advortas* rather than with *volo*; and in *Bacch.* 909–10 oro ut
facias et ted obsecro cave parsis dicere, *ut facias* is unquestionably subordinate to *oro*,
and we may be justified in asserting that *cave parsis* is in the same relationship to
obsecro; but in both cases the language is too loose to permit of a positive analysis.
An interesting example is *Poen.* 117 cave dirrumpatis quaeso, sinite transigi, where
cave, like *vale*, *salve*, and *ave* (on which cf. above, note 7) and also *age* (as in *Mil.* 928
age abite), is employed as an invariable form without regard to number; had this usage
developed, *cave* might have become a mere conjunction as *licet* did, and in that case it
would presumably have been used, like *ne*, as readily in subordinate as in main clauses.
But this did not happen, and I know of no instance of the imperative *cave* in an in-
dubitably dependent clause.   I do know of cases in which the imperative *cave* of a
direct command is represented by the subjunctive *caveam* (etc.) or *caverem* (etc.) in an
indirect command, as *Men.* 784–5 edixi tibi ut caveres neuter iretis, *Pseud.* 127–8
omnibus edico a me ut caveant ne credant mihi, *Pseud.* 897–9 edixit ut caverem a
Pseudolo servo suo ne fidem ei haberem.   But in all these *caveo* is more of an inde-
pendent verb and less of an auxiliary than it is in the simple periphrasis with the
imperative; thus the last two can be compared with passages in which *caveo* occurs
without an accompanying verb at all, as *Pseud.* 1227 dixin ab eo tibi ut caveres?   I
cannot cite any comparable examples of a subjunctive corresponding to *noli*, though,
according to Allen-Greenough (§588a note 2), instances with *nollet* exist; but certainly
the normal construction for a quoted prohibition was the subjunctive introduced by
ne, as in Caesar, *Bell. Gall.* 7.29.1 cohortatus est ne se animo demitterent, ne per-
turbarentur incommodo, which assuredly represents *nolite vos animo demittere, nolite
perturbari incommodo* of the direct discourse.

   [19] Cf. above, note 6.   The importance of this advantage is not affected by the fact
that the Romans could, and did, occasionally use the present subjunctive after an
historical tense.   This may in early Latin have been largely, as Hofmann says (703),
a vestige of the original parataxis; but later it was undoubtedly introduced in the
interest of clearness or vividness, and in the classical period "repraesentatio" became
an important stylistic device (see in general Hofmann 703–5, and, on the particularly
common disregard of sequence in indirect discourse in Livy, Conway 187–97).   But
the fact that an author to gain a special effect was free to use the present subjunctive
where a slavish obedience to "rules" would have demanded the imperfect subjunctive,
would not in any way diminish, indeed it would increase, the inconvenience of the
imperative, which would force the writer *always*, willy-nilly, to employ the present.

III

In quoted questions the use of the subjunctive is much harder
to account for than in quoted commands, since here the original
direct discourse frequently had the indicative. Here again the
fact that a great many of the quoted questions, like a great many
of the quoted commands, had the subjunctive even in direct dis-
course may have helped lead to the establishment of this mood
everywhere. The types of subjunctive that have been particularly
cited in this connection are the deliberative[20] (which I use in the
broad sense to include the variety termed "jussive" by Handford,[21]
and also the subjunctive used in a repudiating question[22]) and the
potential.[23] I do not doubt that the common use in indirect ques-
tions of the subjunctives named did serve as a *contributing* factor in
the generalization of the mood everywhere; yet I question whether
this alone could have been a *determining* factor, since otherwise we
might expect the spread of the mood at least to some extent in
direct questions of fact as well as in *indirect*, which we know did not
take place. The triumph of the subjunctive over the indicative
in indirect questions is really not in the least comparable to its
triumph over the imperative in indirect commands, for two reasons:
(1) the indicative was fully available in indirect discourse for any
needed person, number, and tense, just as the subjunctive was,
whereas the imperative was not; (2) the subjunctive was practically
equivalent to the imperative, but by no means to the indicative.
In regard to point 2, it must be admitted that one tense of the in-
dicative, namely, the future, does interchange with the subjunctive
to a considerable degree at least in some categories, such as the
deliberative; and it is precisely with the deliberative subjunctive
that I believe the development of the subjunctive as the mood of

[20] See especially Delbrück 278, Bennett 326 ("200 out of the 1150 indirect ques-
tions in Early Latin are merely dependent deliberatives"), Hofmann 693 and 700,
Handford 64–6.

[21] This is a particular type recognized by Handford (62–3) as a special category
used in questions. I prefer to class such subjunctives as "deliberative" or possibly
"dubitative," since these terms describe the point of view of the questioner, whereas
"jussive" applies to the response of the person questioned.

[22] Here again (cf. note 21) Handford treats this as a special category, which he
discusses at considerable length (66–82), and to which, in an ingenious and convincing
exposition, he attaches particular importance in the generalization of the subjunctive
used in indirect questions (173–5).

[23] So, tentatively, Bennett 326–7; otherwise Delbrück 278 and 280.

indirect questions in general did take place, as I shall show later. But I think this problem needs a more searching investigation and a more detailed elucidation than it has so far received from those who uphold the theory that the deliberative subjunctive was the starting-point for the subjunctive in indirect questions. Before undertaking this, however, I wish to deal briefly with the other types of subjunctive that have been suggested as playing at least some part in the evolution of the usage.

Handford's explanation (173–5) in regard to the subjunctive in a repudiating question` is ingenious; and what I shall say later about the deliberative subjunctive in general applies equally to the repudiating type, which, as I have already stated, I consider merely a variety of the deliberative.

But concerning the potential subjunctive I am extremely dubious. Of this type Bennett writes as follows (327): "Without any effort to gather complete material under this head, I have noted 75 instances of indirect questions of fact which may have developed from potentials." In this connection he places particular stress on the type *eloquere quid velis, scio quid velis*, etc. I doubt, however, whether all of Bennett's examples would have had the subjunctive in direct discourse. For instance, two of the passages which he cites (326 and 327 respectively) are *Cas.* 280 eloquere quid velis and 287 quid velis id velim me scire. In both of these I believe the subjunctive is due to indirect discourse, or possibly, in the case of the second, to "attraction"; in the direct discourse I think we would have had *quid vis?*, as seems to be indicated by the fact that the answer to the first is *volo*, not *velim*, precisely as *volo* answers *quid vis?* in *Cist.* 362–3 and *Poen.* 1196–7. A passage (not cited by Bennett) in which the subjunctive *velim* is indubitably due to quotation and not to potentiality is *Amph.* 1025 quid nunc vis? — at etiam quid velim, id tu me rogas? On the other hand it cannot be denied that an original *quid vis* is sometimes retained in the indirect discourse, as in *Aul.* 777 age nunc loquere quid vis and 780–1 nunc quid vis id volo noscere (which, to be sure, can be punctuated as a direct question). Another pair of examples that may cancel each other out are *Cist.* 56–7 eloquere utrumque nobis, et quid tibi est et quid velis, and *Capt.* 375–7 nuntium, qui me quid rerum hic agitem et quid fieri velim patri omnem rem perferat. Bennett is presumably right (327) in calling *velis* in the first potential, since it

is parallel with the indicative *est*;[24] in the second, in view of the fact
that Tyndarus probably speaks politely and respectfully in sending
a message to his (pretended) father, *velim* may be potential, but it
need not be, since it is parallel with the subjunctive *agitem*, which
surely is not.   More certain examples of the subjunctive of *volo*
in a clearly non-potential use are *Poen.* 992–3 appella quid velit,
quid venerit, qui sit, quoiatis, unde sit, and *Truc.* 862–3 scio me-
castor quid v⟨el⟩is[25] et quid postules et quid petas; me videre vis, et
me te amare postulas, puerum petis.   In the first there is no
reason to assume that *velit* is anything but subjunctive in indirect
question, like the verbs coordinated with it; and it would seem
certain that that is what *velis* is in the second, where we have both
indirect and direct discourse given in rapid succession.

In short, some passages support Bennett and some do not.[26]

Still less satisfactory than the view that the use of the sub-
junctive in *some* direct questions led to its use in *all* indirect ques-
tions is the alternative explanation that the use of the subjunctive
in indirect questions is due simply to the fact that these are sub-
ordinate clauses.[27]   Even in early Latin, the subjunctives in
indirect questions far outnumber the indicatives,[28] but there is no

[24] It is true, however, that indicative and subjunctive are sometimes made parallel
with no appreciable difference of meaning; on this see below, note 43.

[25] Even here, the codices have *vis*, but Camerarius' emendation *velis* seems neces-
sary, though not all editors accept it.

[26] From the nature of the case, none prove him absolutely wrong, since it must
not be forgotten that he is discussing the *origin* of the use of the subjunctive in indirect
questions, and our earliest literary remains belong to a transitional period in which
the development of the usage is already well under way (though not complete as it
may be said to be in the classical period), so that we may expect to find instances of
both the old and the new usage side by side, with no appreciable difference in force.
Cf. below, note 43.

[27] This is especially the view of Ernout and Thomas, who say of the subjunctive
in general that it "tendit à élargir son domaine en phrase dépendante et à s'employer
sans valeur propre comme signe de la subordination" (247), and of indirect questions
in particular that "la subordination s'y traduit par l'emploi du subjonctif" (266).
In connection with their assertion (248) that the subjunctive "souligne simplement
la dépendance de la proposition où il se trouve," they surprisingly add, "À cette
fonction se rattache le nom même de subjonctif."   Apparently they do not realize
that "modus subiunctivus" is simply a Latin translation of the ἔγκλισις ὑποτακτική of
the Greek grammarians, who actually restricted the use of the subjunctive to sub-
ordinate clauses; see the present author, *TAPA* 82.33 note 11.

[28] According to Bennett's figures, there are 217 cases of the indicative (120–3),
and 1150 of the subjunctive, at least according to his preliminary statement (326);
his examples (328–35) seem to me to add up to at least 1175, but perhaps there is some
unspecified overlapping.

hint of a widespread tendency to use the subjunctive rather than the indicative in subordinate clauses of other types.[29] And in classical Latin, in which indubitably the use of the subjunctive in subordinate clauses tended constantly to extend, there were none the less certain types (such as temporal clauses with *ubi* and *post-quam*) that took the subjunctive only in the most exceptional cases, and numerous types in which a shift from indicative to subjunctive either changed the meaning with a given conjunction (such as *quod*, *cum*, *dum*, *priusquam*), or, in addition to changing the meaning, demanded a different conjunction (e.g., in adversative clauses, *quamquam* almost always accompanied the indicative, and *quamvis* the subjunctive). Were the subjunctive merely the mood of sub-ordination, these neat distinctions, instead of developing as they actually did, would have been completely wiped out.

Mere subordination, then, will certainly not account for the preponderance of the subjunctive in indirect discourse even in early Latin, and for its almost exclusive use in classical Latin.

However, there are, I believe, certain factors that make the use of a subjunctive in a question more likely in a subordinate clause than in a principal clause.

If we are to understand these factors, it must be granted first and foremost that the subjunctive was a tense before it was a mood.[30] In early Latin, the future and the subjunctive are used almost interchangeably: the future often has modal force that in classical Latin was restricted to the subjunctive, and the subjunctive often has temporal force that in classical Latin was restricted to the future. There are many examples of this variation in deliberative and dubitative questions, perhaps facilitated by the fact that in

[29] For instance, *cum* clauses, temporal, causal, and adversative, have the indicative in 504 instances (Bennett 79–86, 134–5, 141-2), and the subjunctive in only 33 (302–3), some of them doubtful (I am of course excluding the 82 *cum* clauses in which there is a clear reason for the use of the subjunctive, 5 with the "characteristic" subjunctive, 50 with the subjunctive by "attraction," 27 with the indefinite second singular; see Bennett 292 and 302).

[30] I try to establish this thesis in my monograph, *Subjunctive and Optative: Their Origin as Futures* (referred to here as Hahn). I hold that the original force in Indo-European of the subjunctive was vivid futurity, and of the optative more remote futurity or potentiality. All Latin futures are derived from Indo-European subjunctives; and I believe that all Latin subjunctives are derived either from Indo-European optatives (though some of these have been thought to come from Indo-European subjunctives) or, in the case of the -*a*- subjunctives, from Indo-European indicatives which had become equivalent to optatives.

two of the conjugations the future and the subjunctive are identical in the first person singular, which is precisely the form most commonly used in these questions. Thus we have beside some ambiguous forms a clear future in *Hec.* 516 quid agam? quo me vortam? quid viro meo respondebo?, and a clear subjunctive in *Ad.* 789 quid faciam? quid agam? quid clamem aut querar? The same speaker actually shifts from a series of subjunctives to a series of futures, saying in *Capt.* 531 quid machiner? quid comminiscar?, but in *Capt.* 535 quid loquar? quid fabulabor? quid negabo aut quid fatebor? Similarly in the *Rudens*, we have a series of parallel questions introduced by *censen* (1269), in which we find future indicatives, *censen hodie despondebit* (1269) and *gratulabor* (1270), and then the subjunctive *salutem* (1275), followed by an indeterminate form, probably to be taken as a subjunctive, *complectar* (1277). An imperative may be followed, apparently without distinction of meaning, by either the future or the subjunctive: we find the alternation both in the type (discussed above in note 21) that Handford calls jussive, as in *Rud.* 1370 propera. — quid properabo?, vs. *Curc.* 599 propera. — quid properem?; and in the repudiating type, as in *Men.* 197–8 salta. — ego saltabo?, vs. *Aul.* 81–2 intus serva. — ego intus servem? We also find deliberatives with the present indicative; probably these are derived from the very common *quid ago?* (as in *Bacch.* 1196), in which *ago* is really an old subjunctive but was interpreted as an indicative, thus introducing the indicative seen in the also common *quid agimus?* (as in *Ep.* 157 and *Mil.* 250).[31]

Thus we have in primary sequence three practically equivalent

[31] Cf. Hahn 59 note 112, and 60 note 114. Since *-o* is a primary ending and Latin subjunctives have secondary endings, I believe this *-o* must have originally belonged to the future (which is derived, as we have already noted, from an Indo-European subjunctive and has primary endings) and then have been borrowed by the subjunctive, just as, inversely, the future borrowed its first person ending *-am* from the subjunctive. This interchange would have occurred in the third and fourth conjugations; later the *-o* would have spread elsewhere, giving us first conjugation forms, as in *Most.* 774 voco huc hominem? Perhaps this is the explanation for the group with *cesso*, cited by Bennett (24) as perhaps "forming an exception to Sjögren's principle that the present indicative is not employed in true deliberative questions." Note e.g. *Merc.* 130 at etiam asto? at etiam cesso foribus facere hisce assulas? However, it may well be that in this type the verb is a genuine indicative, either a true present, "am I hesitating?", or present as substitute for future, "shall I hesitate?" Cf. with the present indicative *asto* in the example just cited the future *astabo* in *Mil.* 1021 hic astabo tantisper? In that case it is the tense rather than the mood of *cesso* that is slightly anomalous.

forms of expression, present indicative (rare), future indicative, and present subjunctive; but in secondary sequence there can be only one, the imperfect subjunctive.[32]   In the phrase *quid agam?* or *quid faciam?*, the verb may be *either* indicative (as the preceding *quom ipse veniet*, if the reading is right, proves it to be in *Bacch.* 633–4, and as the parallel *respondebo* proves it to be in *Hec.* 516 quid agam? quo me vortam? quid viro meo respondebo?) *or* subjunctive (as the parallel *clamem* proves it to be in *Ad.* 789 quid faciam? quid agam? quid clamem aut querar?); but when either is projected into the past, the only possibility is the subjunctive (as in *Merc.* 633 quid facerem?); the imperfect indicative could mean only "what was I doing?", corresponding to the present indicative "what am I doing?"   Now in direct discourse we do not very often have occasion for this type of expression; a person asking advice or expressing despair usually says "what *am* I to do?", not "what *was* I to do?"[33]   But in quotations the main verb is past at least as often as it is present, and when that is the case sequence of tenses demands the imperfect subjunctive; thus since the imperfect subjunctive is the only possibility in secondary sequence, the corresponding present subjunctive would come to seem natural in primary sequence, and would tend to crowd out the equivalent future indicative.   This may well be the reason why, though in direct discourse we have an abundance of instances of deliberative questions with the future, corresponding to every use with the subjunctive,[34] in indirect discourse examples with the indicative are extremely rare, though those with the subjunctive are numerous.[35]

[32] Cf. Hale and Buck 267–8.

[33] Bennett's statistics for the deliberative subjunctive (178–91) give a total of 374 examples of the present subjunctive, and only 30 of the imperfect subjunctive. Furthermore, all the lists illustrating the use of the imperfect subjunctive are exhaustive, but not all of those illustrating the use of the present.   Of the five categories which he recognizes, two, the "subjunctive of inquiry after a command or advice" (179) and the "true deliberative" (184), show no imperfects at all.

[34] Cf. Bennett 40.   For examples of the future, see 40–1; of the subjunctive, 178–91.

[35] Bennett reports only three instances with the indicative (123), but 185 with the subjunctive, according to his lists (328–33), or 200, according to his preliminary statement (326).   Perhaps the three with the indicative should be reduced to two, one with the present indicative, *Stich.* 706, the other with the future, *Ep.* 274; the third, from Accius, is punctuated as an indirect question by Ribbeck (185, line 191), but as a direct question by Warmington (2.376, line 155).   To these Bräunlich (12 note 11)

Hence the subjunctive becomes established as the norm in deliberative questions in indirect discourse, even though the indicative was equally possible in direct discourse.

Once this had happened, the occurrence of the potential subjunctive in a fairly large number of indirect questions, whether in primary or in secondary sequence, may, as already granted, have served to some extent as a reinforcing agent to the influence of the deliberative subjunctive. But it should be noted that there is an important difference between deliberative and potential in early Latin, namely, that the future as well as the subjunctive is often used, as just noted, with deliberative force, but very seldom, if ever, with demonstrably potential force.[36] This is natural if I am correct in my view that the fundamental difference between the Indo-European subjunctive, which produced Latin futures, and the Indo-European optative, which produced Latin subjunctives, is precisely that the former served primarily to express more vivid futurity and the latter to express less vivid futurity or potentiality.[37] Thus if there was a clear-cut distinction, in the matter of fact vs. potentiality, between the indicative, even in the future, on the one hand, and the subjunctive on the other, I question whether the potential subjunctive when used in indirect questions could have played a rôle at all comparable to that of the deliberative subjunctive in ousting the indicative in indirect questions of *fact*.

Finally, what of questions of fact themselves? They of course constitute the greatest problem.

When questions of fact are transferred from direct to indirect discourse, they may take either the indicative or the subjunctive. The indicative is much commoner in early Latin than in classical Latin,[38] but even in early Latin the subjunctive is far commoner than the indicative.[39] The essential point, however, is that at no period is there any consistent demonstrable difference in force between the two moods.[40] Becker holds that even the early

adds *Mil.* 1183 and Lucilius 375 (Marx) =9.25 (Mueller), but in these the reading is doubtful.

[36] Cf. Sjögren 109, Bennett 44–5, Hahn 123 and 149.

[37] Cf. note 30.

[38] Cf. Bräunlich 165–6.

[39] Cf. Bräunlich 169; also see above, note 28.

[40] Cf. the conclusion of Bräunlich's careful study (158): "There are found, in the Latin of all periods and all styles, a rather large number of indicative clauses which are most naturally interpreted as indirect questions and a smaller number which, if the sole or best manuscript tradition is followed, must indubitably be so interpreted.

writers were governed by certain fixed laws[41] in their choice of
mood,[42] but to me Miss Bräunlich's refutation of him (xx–xxiii)
seems convincing.   Lindsay holds (66) that where the indicative
occurs, we have a direct question paratactically used, and where
the subjunctive occurs, we have an indirect question; but this is
circular reasoning based on — or, rather, resorting to — a mere
matter of external labels.   I think he is refuted by his own ex-
amples, showing variation in mood in strictly parallel clauses,
either in adjacent passages, such as *Bacch.* 555 dic modo hominem
qui sit and 558 dic quis est, or even in the same passage, such as
Amph. 17–8 nunc quoiius iussu venio et quam ob rem venerim

These indicative clauses have, the first group probably, and the second group certainly,
exactly the same force as *subjunctive* indirect questions of fact."   I find her evidence
very impressive, despite the skepticism expressed by Baehrens in his review (*BPW* 43
col. 224) and by Oliver in his reference (141 note 26).   Baehrens thinks that she should
have given examples of indirect questions with the subjunctive, in order to make it
possible to ascertain "ob sich die Gründe für die Verwendung der verschiedenen Modi
noch fühlbar machen," but that would have meant listing for each document examined
every indirect question with the subjunctive as well as every one with the indicative!
Surely the writer of a dissertation is justified in delimiting her project, and Miss
Bräunlich's was to prove that the supposed rule demanding the subjunctive in indirect
questions has many more exceptions than had been thought, *not* to find a reason for
every exception.   Oliver thinks she "does not make sufficient allowance for parataxis
on the one hand or for corruption of texts on the other."   In early Latin there are
surely abundant examples which we who read them may view as either paratactic or
hypotactic (probably those who pronounced or heard them could tell the difference);
but even there, and to a still greater degree in the more polished and sophisticated
writing of the classical period, when we find a shift from the person and/or the tense
of the original direct question but do *not* find a shift from the mood, I do not see how
it can be asserted that we have an example of parataxis.   As for corruption of texts,
that is a problem that we have always with us; but I do not think we are justified,
when we establish a rule and then find a number of exceptions to it, in seeking to
emend all the exceptions out of existence.

   [41] He seems to think that these laws existed independently of the language, and
that the early writers should have conformed to them and actually did try to do so,
though at times they did not succeed.   Cf. e.g. (313) "apparet, quam difficile fuerit
priscis scriptoribus in re nova certas et constituere ingeniose et constanter observare
leges syntacticas"; and again (313–4) "certum quidem sensum vel instinctum eos
secutos esse in oratione concinnanda, at tamen ab experimento omnia nata esse neque
deesse locos, in quibus ingeniosae licentiae nimis indulserint."

   [42] See Becker 119–20, and cf. 303.   As an example of the difference between
indicative and subjunctive, he cites *Amph.* 1129 hanc rem ut facta est eloquar and
Trin. 236 Amoris artis eloquar quem ad modum se expediant, declaring that the first
involves simple narration and the second involves in addition the speaker's opinion
(304); but his point seems to me wholly vitiated by the use of the *subjunctive* in such a
passage as *Men.* 519 uxori rem omnem iam uti sit gesta eloquar (it is true that *eloquar*
is a subjunctive here, but *sit gesta* is not the type of subjunctive that is due to "attrac-
tion") and *Cist.* 565 ut sit de ea re eloquar.

dicam. Surely the indicative clauses show no lesser degree of subordination than the subjunctive clauses,[43] nor do they differ from them in any other essential.[44]

Obviously, the shift in mood from indicative to subjunctive in indirect questions of fact must have begun with questions referring to the future. Bennett (334) reports that there are 68 instances of the use of the subjunctive in indirect questions referring to the future, and certainly in this type there seems to have been a strong tendency to use the subjunctive rather than the future.[45] Here the subjunctive presumably served as a tense rather than as a mood.[46] Indeed Hale (34) recognizes in some of these passages[47] instances of his "anticipatory subjunctive," which according to him occurs in Latin but only in dependent clauses: "the strictly independent construction has been entirely displaced by the future indicative, before the time when Latin literature begins" (12). If Hale is right, we have a rule that covers our present problem: the subjunctive is used in indirect questions of fact to refer to the

[43] Lindsay is reduced to this rather desperate expedient by his determination to cling in the face of conflicting evidence to his theory (on which see below, note 85) that the two moods are never used "quite at random" but always express "a particular nuance of thought" (65). However, it is no true solution to call the indicative clause paratactic and the subjunctive clause hypotactic. The period of early Latin literature was in certain ways a period of transition (as indeed every period must be in one way or another, since language constantly changes); but in the matter of indirect questions the transition from parataxis to hypotaxis was much nearer completion than that from indicative to subjunctive, and thus we not only find contemporaneously possible examples of the old parataxis and positive examples of the new hypotaxis, but also positive examples of hypotaxis some with the old indicative and some with the new subjunctive. For examples in addition to *Amph.* 17–8, just cited in the text, of the coordination without appreciable difference of meaning of indicative and subjunctive, see Bennett 121 (however, I think he is wrong in including *Most.* 199 vides quae sim, et quae fui ante, where I believe the second clause is exclamatory, not interrogative; contrast *Most.* 149 scio ut nunc sum atque ut fui).

[44] It must not be forgotten that at times metrical convenience may be a determining factor; so too the demands of the clausula (on this see Skutsch, *Glotta* 3.366).

[45] For instance, in the numerous indirect questions in Plautus with *scio* and *nescio* as recorded by Lodge, while the indicative occurs not rarely (even though by no means so commonly as the subjunctive), the *only* examples with the *future* indicative are *Men.* 434 scio ut me dices, where the reading is not certain, and *Men.* 425 scin quid te amabo ut facias?, where the stereotyped *amabo* can hardly count as a genuine future, since it really provides a more polite and persuasive substitute for *scin quid volo ut facias?* (cf. *ib.* 207 scin quid volo ego te accurare?).

[46] See above, note 30.

[47] From early Latin he cites Ennius, *Ann.* 85–6 (Vahlen) omnes avidi spectant quam mox emittat currus, *Phorm.* 606 exspecto quam mox recipiat sese Geta, and *And.* 127 quam timeo quorsum evadas!

future, but not in the direct questions to which they correspond, because it is never used in independent clauses. And, even if he is wrong, as I think he is, in his general theory,[48] he certainly is right in regard to questions. I can cite some passages in which a subjunctive in the main clause assuredly seems to have the force of a future, e.g. *Aul.* 569–70 potare ego hodie tecum volo. — non potem ego quidem hercle, and generalizations such as Lucilius, *Inc.* 23 (Mueller) quantum habeas, tantum ipse sies; but I can cite no instance of a subjunctive in an independent question of fact referring to the future (or to any other temporal sphere for that matter). But what Hale offers us is merely a rule, not a reason: the question still arises as to why the subjunctive disappeared, if it did, in the main clause (in this case, the direct question) but not in the dependent clause (the indirect question), or, contrariwise, why it was preserved in the indirect question but not in the direct question. Also, we must note that in the indirect question, the subjunctive did not merely *survive*, it *spread*.

All the evidence points to an original use in dependent questions of the same form as we meet in independent questions — and this in questions of fact referring to the future is the future indicative. Let me point out once more that, whether in main or in dependent clauses, the future and the subjunctive at times interchange, and they do this because they approach so closely in meaning, *both* referring to the future sphere; but in the case of the future tense the futurity is more vivid, hence the common use of this form in a factual sense; and in the case of the subjunctive it is less vivid, hence the common use of this form in a deliberative or potential sense.[49] I am willing to admit that, in a given instance, the subjunctive might be substituted in a special type of indirect question for the future in a corresponding type of direct question, especially if there were other contributing factors; but if this shift eventually

---

[48] See Kroll, *Glotta* 7.122 and 152, Handford 39 and 83, and Hahn 33 and 124–9. Even scholars such as Bennett and Hofmann who deny the existence of a subjunctive of pure futurity (153 and 572 respectively) have to admit that we meet subjunctives in Plautus where we would expect the future (Hofmann 554) or that certain subjunctives are "equivalent to a future indicative" (Bennett 201; cf. 161).

[49] Thus in some ways the Latin future corresponds to the Greek subjunctive, and the Latin subjunctive corresponds to the Greek optative. Hale is guilty of a serious error in methodology in his constant equation of the Latin subjunctive with the Greek subjunctive, since the two, though they do resemble each other in some ways, have different origins.

became the norm everywhere, as indeed it did, I do not think we can account for it by saying that in the indirect question we have an anticipatory subjunctive, which occurs in dependent but not in independent clauses. That after all is not so different in result, even though it is wholly different in approach, from the explanation refuted above of the subjunctive as the mood of dependence. There must be another reason for the shift in mood; we may not be able to find it, but we can, and should, at least try.

To begin with, I am, as I have already indicated, quite willing to agree that in questions of fact referring to the future, the subjunctive is a tense rather than a mood. This is attested by the fact that the substitution for the simple subjunctive of a periphrastic form[50] is by no means common, and was probably a comparatively late development.[51] Furthermore, when it does occur, it frequently seems used to avoid *modal*, not *temporal*, ambiguity. That is, the simple present subjunctive can refer to the future, and, though the periphrastic may be substituted for it, it need not be; I see no fundamental difference in force between e.g. *Ep.* 320–1 exspectando exedor quo modo Epidici dicta evenant, and *Poen.* 817 exspecto quo pacto meae techinae processurae sient.[52] But certain subjunctive locutions, notably *quid agam* and *quid faciam*,[53] are so commonly used in deliberative questions,[54] that when they occur in indirect questions they are naturally taken as deliberative there also, as in e.g. *Amph.* 1056 and *Aul.* 730 quid agam nescio, *Cas.* 938 and *Stich.* 166 nec quid agam scio, *Aul.* 106 quid agam scio, *Pseud.* 779 nescio quid faciam, *Capt.* 617 nec quid faciam scio, *Most.* 381 quaero quid faciam.[55] It is probably to avoid danger of

---

[50] Cf. Ernout and Thomas (335): "cette locution appartient surtout — quoique non exclusivement — à la langue littéraire, et elle apparaît de préférence dans certains tours."

[51] Cf. Handford 158.

[52] So too in the past: cf. e.g. *Phorm.* 490 mirabar si tu mihi quicquam adferres novi, and *Heaut.* 569 metui quid futurum denique esset.

[53] In the 63 passages that Bennett cites as examples of "true deliberatives" (184) and of "subjunctives of impossibility or helplessness" (185–6), *quid agam* (or *agas*) occurs 18 times, and *quid faciam* (*facias, facerem, faceres*) also 18 times. In Plautus alone, there are (according to Lodge) 16 examples of *quid agam* and its variants, 37 of *quid faciam* and its variants.

[54] Of course these may also appear in the future in direct discourse, as *Mil.* 973 quid faciemus concubina?; but there is only one example (and that not a certain one) in indirect discourse, *Ep.* 274 quin tu eloquere quid faciemus? Cf. above, note 35.

[55] Further examples are: with *agam* (*agas, agat*), *Cist.* 511, *Mil.* 198 and 1097, *Most.* 689 and 1068, *Pseud.* 379 and 765; with *faciam* (*facias*), *Men.* 947, *Mil.* 1034, *Most.* 678, *Pers.* 154.

ambiguity that in a future question of *fact* we find not *agam* and
faciam, but *acturus sim* and *facturus sim*,[56] as *Bacch.* 722 nescis
quid ego acturus sim, *Merc.* 572 scis quid acturus siem, *Pers.* 144
quin dicis quid facturu' sis?; these correspond to *agam* and *faciam*
as does the periphrastic future of the direct discourse (e.g. *Pseud.*
395 quid nunc acturu's? and 751 quid es acturus?, *Capt.* 789 quidnam
acturust?[57]) to the deliberative subjunctive there (e.g. *Most.* 662
et al. quid ego nunc agam?).   In strict logic, we should have the
indicative in these periphrastic forms in indirect as well as in direct
questions, and we do indeed have it in *Pseud.* 387 cedo mihi quid
es facturus (which, however, can be punctuated as a direct ques-
tion); cf. too *As.* 376 dico ut facturu' sum and *Aul.* 174 scio quid
dictura es.   But several factors may have contributed to the use
of the subjunctive in these periphrases: (1) the influence of the
subjunctive in the extremely common *quid agam* or *quid faciam*
type (the employment of the future participle, with its additional
nuance of determination,[58] may have seemed sufficiently to differ-
entiate factual from deliberative force without a change in mood);
(2) the fact that it was possible, by a sort of redundancy, to use
the periphrastic form even in a genuinely deliberative setting, as in
Pseud. 567 quo id sim facturus pacto nihil etiam scio, and *Hec.* 614
incertus sum etiam quid sim facturus "I still am uncertain as to
what I'm going to do" — i.e. "I haven't yet made up my mind";
(3) the possibility of another sort of redundancy, i.e. the use of the
subjunctive as a quasi-future auxiliary with the future participle;[59]

[56] Thus it may be questioned whether the statement by Ernout and Thomas
(235), "cette périphrase servait de simple substitut au futur à l'infinitif . . . et au
subjonctif," is not too sweeping as applied to early Latin, at least so far as the sub-
junctive goes (and even in regard to the infinitive, the frequent use of the present for
the future must not be forgotten; cf. Bennett 426–7).   Handford is more guarded; of
-urus sim etc. he says simply (158) that "these forms, to a much greater extent than
the indic. forms, *tended* to lose their proper significance, and to serve merely as addi-
tional tenses in the subj. paradigm" (italics mine).   Hofmann (556) is at the opposite
pole from Ernout and Thomas: "die periphrastische Konjugation fügt also dem
neutralen Futurbegriff stets eine subjektive Schattierung der Bestimmung."

[57] The second is asked of Pseudolus, and the third is asked concerning Ergasilus,
in a genuine desire for information.   The first is addressed by Pseudolus to himself in
a moment of difficulty.   A more timorous slave might well have said here, *quid agam?*
or, if he were talking to himself, as Pseudolus is, *quid agas?*; but Pseudolus is always
brash and resourceful, so he does not despair (cf. his grandiloquent boast, 404–5
viginti minas, quae nunc nusquam sunt gentium, inveniam tamen).

[58] Cf. again Hofmann 556 (quoted in note 56).

[59] This may possibly have been facilitated by the combination of the future indica-
tive of the auxiliary with the future participle, which occurs commonly in early Latin,

(4) the fact that the future participle could express determination from an outside agency, even destiny, in which case the subjunctive auxiliary perhaps tends not toward the deliberative as in *Hec.* 614, but toward the "jussive," as in *Mil.* 1183 quin tu dicis quid facturu' sim?,[60] or possibly even toward the potential, as in *Hec.* 567–8 ut hic laturus hoc siet, non edepol clam me est. Hence the subjunctive might become established — illogically to be sure — in the *quid acturus sim* type as well as in the *quid agam* type of indirect question; and the more the use of the mood spread, for whatever reason, the more it would thenceforth tend to spread.

There are also two other ways in which the *quid agam* type might contribute to the generalization of the subjunctive.

(1) We have noted repeated examples of the locution (a) after negative expressions of knowing, as *nescio* and *non . . . scio*; (b) after affirmative expressions of uncertainty, as *quaero*; (c) after affirmative expressions of knowing, as *scio*. In the first two cases, we have a true deliberative; there is a genuine difference between "I don't know (or I ask) what I am to do" and "I don't know (or I ask) what I am doing." But the third case, which was probably an analogical development patterned after the first two, is far less clear-cut: *scio quid agam*, which has about the same force (and the same ambiguity) as the English "I know what I'm about," may mean either "I know what I am to do" (in which case *agam* is probably a subjunctive) or "I know what I shall do" (in which case *agam* is perhaps a future indicative[61]), and neither one is very different in force from "I know what I'm doing." A good example of this transitional stage is *Trin.* 639 scio ego et sentio ipse quid agam; Morris *ad loc.* declares we would have a subjunctive in the direct question also, and yet I do not feel that the passage is very

though not, so far as I know, in comedy. However, this combination was *not* a mere redundant equivalent of the future in early Latin (although Hofmann, 556, seems to think it was, and although it certainly did become so in late Latin). We find it mainly in laws and in Cato, in clauses depending directly or indirectly on a future imperative, and it is used there in its full, literal sense, e.g.: Lex Iul. Mun. (*CIL* 1.206) 147–9 ex formula census, quae Romae ab eo qui tum censum populi *acturus erit* pro posita erit, ab ieis iurateis accipito; Cato, *Agr.* 30 ubi sementim *facturus eris*, ibi oves delectato.

⁶⁰ Cf. similar examples with *sum*, as *Ep.* 377 haec scitis iam ut futura sint and *Heaut.* 569 metui quid futurum esset. In *Mil.* 1183, however, the reading *sum* also exists (cf. note 35).

⁶¹ In this instance, as we have seen, *scio quid acturus sum* or the commoner *scio quid acturus sim* is rather to be expected but is not inevitable.

different from *Bacch.* 78 scio quid ago.[62]   Once we have *quid agam*
in indirect questions established as a correspondent to *either quid
agam* or *quid ago* in direct questions, the next step is to use *quid agam*
in the indirect question where *only quid ago* would be met in the
direct question, either in the general sense of "what am I doing?",
as *Mil.* 995 aucupet me quid agam and *Most.* 34 quid tibi med aut
quid ego agam curatiost?,[63] or in the special sense of "how am I?",
as *Aul.* 117 (probably) rogitant me ut valeam, quid agam, quid
rerum geram, and *Mil.* 708 me curabunt, visent quid agam, ecquid
velim. [64]   That the balance of the direct *quid agis* and the indirect
quid agas has been fully established by Plautus' day is proved —
were proof needed — by such a passage as *Stich.* 333 quid agis? —
quid agam rogitas?, where the only reason for the use of the sub-
junctive is its occurrence in quotation.   This is in striking contrast
with a deliberative question as in *Rud.* 379 quid faceret? — rogas
quid faceret?, where the subjunctive belongs alike in the direct
and in the indirect discourse.

   (2) We have also noted that *quid ago* is used as a substitute for
quid agam, and that, though *ago* in this usage may be an old sub-
junctive, it was interpreted as an indicative and generated the
parallel use of indubitable indicatives, as *agis* and *agimus*.   If an
(apparent) indicative could be substituted for a subjunctive, then
contrariwise it would seem that a subjunctive could be substituted
for an indicative; and thus the use of the subjunctive in an indirect
question to correspond to the indicative in a direct question would
in still another way be facilitated.   A striking instance is the
deliberative question, *Bacch.* 1196 quid ago? — quid agas rogitas
etiam?   We may compare this with the two passages cited at the
close of the preceding paragraph.   If *ago* is really a subjunctive,
we have a parallel here for the earlier type, *Rud.* 379; but since
ago seemed to its employer to be an indicative, we have a form of
expression which could have helped to develop the later type,
Stich. 333.   An amusing by-form of *Bacch.* 1196 is the punning

   [62] A parallel in the second person is *Ep.* 161 and *Pers.* 610 vide quid agas "watch
your step!", or (as Nixon translates) "look sharp, now," "mind what you are about
now!"
   [63] Parallels with *quid agat* are *Cas.* 859, *Curc.* 279, *Men.* 465, *Trin.* 865 and 1007
(some editors also read *agat* in *Rud.* 592, but here the manuscript evidence favors the
indicative, quid agit visam); with *quid agant Cas.* 871; with the passive *quid agatur
Truc.* 708.
   [64] Parallels with *quid agat* are *Stich.* 651 and *Truc.* 498; with *quid agant Stich.* 32.

passage *Most.* 368 quid ego ago? — nam quid tu me rogitas quid agas? accubas. Here Tranio roguishly misinterprets Philolaches' despairing deliberative question, "what am I to do?", as a factual indicative question, "what am I doing?", and in echoing this query uses the form *agas* not as a deliberative subjunctive but purely as a subjunctive in an indirect question.

Thus as a result of a great many different factors the subjunctive became established at an early date as at least a possibility, even though not yet a necessity, in indirect questions of fact. The shift must have begun in questions referring to the future, whether in primary sequence, as in *Truc.* 820 timeo quam mox nominer and *As.* 51 quo evadat sum in metu, or secondary sequence, as in *Heaut.* 569 metui quid futurum esset and Ennius, *Ann.* 343–4 (Vahlen) aspectabat virtutem legionis exspectans si mussaret.[65] Thence it would spread to indirect questions referring to the present, probably at first in ambiguous instances, as *Merc.* 110 timeo quid siet, where the meaning may be either "I'm afraid of what is going to happen"[66] or "I'm afraid of what is happening,"[67] then in positive ones, as *Cas.* 638 timeo hoc negoti quid siet and *Poen.* 1249–50 timeo quid hoc sit negoti; and finally to indirect questions referring to the past, as *Mil.* 397 timeo quid rerum gesserim and *Truc.* 809 metuo patres quot fuerint.

IV

The subjunctive in subordinate clauses in indirect discourse presents somewhat the same problems as the subjunctive in indirect questions.

[65] As already noted, once the imperfect subjunctive became established in secondary sequence as a pendant for either the future indicative or the present subjunctive in primary sequence, it would surely tend to react on primary sequence in favor of the subjunctive rather than the indicative, and hence would contribute to a spread of the subjunctive as the normal mood in place of the indicative (cf. above, note 35). However, there seems throughout the classical period to have been a slight tendency to use the subjunctive in secondary tenses where the indicative might have been, or would have been, used in primary tenses (e.g., in iterative temporal clauses, and in *cum* circumstantial clauses; cf. Hahn 136 note 358). It may be relevant in this connection to note Bräunlich's comment (170) that in classical Latin the use of the indicative in indirect questions "was generally confined" to primary sequence, and "seems not to occur" at all after certain secondary tenses (the imperfect and the pluperfect).

[66] So Bennett, who classes this among his "68 instances of indirect questions of fact" in which "the indirect question refers to time relatively future to that of the governing verb" (334).

[67] So Nixon, who translates "I'm afraid of what it means!"

Here too the subjunctive of the indirect discourse corresponds alike to the indicative and the subjunctive of direct discourse.[68] Here too for the former type we find instances in early Latin[69] of what must have been the original mood, namely, the indicative.[70] Here too the occasional use of the indicative survived into the classical period, e.g. in Caesar and Cicero,[71] occurring oftener in primary than in secondary sequence,[72] and especially in references to the future.[73]   Here too it has been suggested that the subjunctive is used as the mood of subordination.[74]   Here too I believe the close relationship of the future indicative and the present subjunctive provides us with a starting-point, with the latter ultimately deriving an advantage from the sole use of the imperfect subjunctive as a counterpart in secondary sequence.[75]

I agree with Bennett (315) and Handford (152) that the origin of the subjunctive in subordinate clauses in indirect discourse is probably to be found in the so-called subjunctive by attraction depending on an infinitive, but I do not agree with Bennett in his view (312)[76] that the immediate origin is in "attraction" after an infinitive *which is logically equivalent to a subjunctive*.   It is true that a great many of the infinitives in the examples cited by Frank (*AJP* 25.428–46) and Bennett (313–4) can be said to be equivalent to subjunctives, being used with such impersonal verbs as *necesse est, oportet, licet, decet*, also with verbs of wishing and ordering; but it is also true that verbs of this sort form a fairly large proportion of those which govern the infinitive aside from the great group of *verba dicendi et sentiendi*.   If the infinitive on which a subjunctive depends follows a verb of saying or thinking, the subjunctive is called a subjunctive in a subordinate clause in indirect discourse and not a subjunctive by attraction, and accordingly Frank and Bennett do not list as examples of attraction

[68] However, no one so far as I know has suggested in *this* case that the use of the subjunctive began with clauses demanding it in direct discourse.

[69] Cf. e.g. *Capt.* 389–92 salutem dicito matri et patri; me hic valere et servitutem servire huic homini optumo, qui me honore honestiorem semper fecit et facit.

[70] Cf. Hofmann 701.

[71] Cf. Lebreton 367 and note 2; Sjögren, *Eranos* 16.6.

[72] Cf. Sjögren, *Eranos* 16.7; Hofmann 701; Handford 152–3.

[73] Cf. Lebreton 365, Handford 152–3, Ernout and Thomas 360.

[74] Cf. Hofmann 701.

[75] On the occasional survival of the future indicative, see the authorities cited in note 73.

[76] Borrowed from Frank, *AJP* 25.446.

subjunctives depending on infinitives that follow such verbs; that leaves mainly infinitives that may be said to be equivalent to subjunctives.

I believe that actually "attraction" was originally a matter not of mood but of tense. Attraction occurs most often when the main verb and the subordinate verb, or at least one of them, refer to the *future*;[77] thus the subjunctive by "attraction" must have been originally used because of its future implications,[78] and in this case, since the main verb was a subjunctive, the use in the subordinate clause of a subjunctive rather than a future was quite natural. However, that the attraction is *temporal* rather than *modal* is proved by the fact that the main verb does not need to be a subjunctive at all; it merely needs to refer to the future. Thus the subjunctive by "attraction" is met with an indicative, as in *Pers.* 16 dabunt di quae exoptes, with an imperative, as in *Amph.* 439 ubi ego Sosia nolim esse, tu esto sane Sosia, or with an infinitive, as in *Stich.* 68–9 pati nos oportet quod ille faciat; and in this last case precisely as in the other two, it is surely the *future* force of the governing verb, here an infinitive,[79] and not its equivalence to a *subjunctive*, that provides the condition favorable for attraction. Now this applies whether the infinitive is in indirect discourse or not. There are future implications in over 50% of Bennett's examples of the "subjunctive by attraction depending on an infinitive,"[80] and in 40% of his examples of the subjunctive in subordinate clauses in indirect discourse.[81]

---

[77] Assimilation also tends to some extent to take place if the two verbs refer to the same time-sphere even when this is *not* the future; however, that would probably have been an analogical development. There are other factors too, such as the position and the type of the subordinate clause; but these are less important. On conditions favoring attraction see Blase 123–4, Antoine 30 and 32, Frank 5–6 and 45–6 (also *CR* 18.411–2), Sjögren 127–30, Thomas 153, Handford 83–4 and 149, Hahn 129–33.

[78] Frank shows a perception of this fact by his comment (12 and 15) that the "anticipatory subjunctive" of Hale formed an important influence in the development of attraction. But as a student of Hale's he does not admit that there may be future implications in the main subjunctive also, and thus he did not go so far as I would in viewing attraction as a *temporal* rather than a modal phenomenon.

[79] In early Latin the present infinitive frequently has future force (cf. note 56); and that is true of the majority of the cases in which the subjunctive is said to be due to "attraction" exerted by the infinitive (cf. note 80).

[80] For details see Hahn 133.

[81] See Bennett 316. Note too his comment (*ib.*) on the group of examples which he regards as on the border-line between attraction and indirect discourse: "Another point of likeness is that these verbs look forward to the future, like those after which we have the infinitive and the attracted subjunctive."

Thus in origin I believe that the two types are one and the same. I would not even say that the subjunctive by attraction produced the subjunctive in subordinate clauses in indirect discourse; I would say that the subjunctive in subordinate clauses in indirect discourse is, in its origin, a variety of the subjunctive by attraction.[82]

The two did in course of time become sharply differentiated. The subjunctive by attraction, unlike most subjunctives, tended to decrease.[83] Naturally, as the subjunctive became less and less a tense and more and more a mood, it ceased to be used in situations demanding primarily a future tense, and came to be used only in situations in which the modal force involved in a main subjunctive prevailed through the subordinate clause also.[84] On the contrary, the subjunctive in a subordinate clause in indirect discourse tended more and more to increase, spreading, as did the subjunctive in indirect questions of fact, from the future sphere to the present and (probably later) to the past. Its wide extension was doubtless at least in part due to the fact that it furnished so neat and convenient a way of distinguishing between the speaker's own authority or responsibility and that of some one else; where a user of Greek or English seeks to disclaim responsibility or to guard himself against a charge of libel by inserting an extra word, ὡς or *al-*

[82] It is relevant to note that the subjunctive in subordinate clauses in indirect discourse, as such, seems to be primarily a Latin development, whereas the subjunctive by attraction goes back to the optative of attraction in the Ursprache; the appearance of attraction in Oscan and Umbrian indicates its Italic origin, and its appearance in Greek too indicates its Indo-European origin (on the former see Frank 15 note 1, Lindsay 67, Bennett 311; on the latter Hahn 115 note 286, 131 note 339).

[83] I do not agree with the comment of Ernout and Thomas (341) concerning the subjunctive by attraction: "c'est dans la prose classique qu'elle est le plus développée." The example there cited, Cicero, *Att.* 7.6.2 nec adhuc fere inveni qui non concedendum putaret Caesari quod postularet, seems to me to be not so much a subjunctive by attraction in general as a subjunctive in a subordinate clauses in indirect discourse (the thought was concedendum est Caesari quod postulat). As I have just indicated, I am willing to treat the latter type of subjunctive as itself a special sub-class of the subjunctive by attraction, at least in origin; but Ernout and Thomas separate the two types, and it is certainly more convenient to do so. It is true that we do *not* have the subjunctive in the similar passage, *ib.* 7.5.5 ego is sum qui illi concedi putem utilius esse quod *postulat*, but the use of the indicative is more natural in quoting one's own thought; illi concedi putem utilius esse quod *postulat* is practically equivalent to illi concedi utilius est quod *postulat*.

[84] Thus I believe that there was always a real reason for attraction in both early and classical Latin, but it was a different reason. Bennett (306) holds that attraction in early Latin was "purely formal and mechanical," and Handford (149) and Ernout and Thomas (340) agree with him, but I do not.

legedly, the speaker of Latin (like the speaker of German) attains the same end by simply shifting the mood.   But to assume, as some have done, that this eventual use of the subjunctive to denote doubt or denial or at least non-affirmation, as opposed to the strict factuality of the indicative, is the basic reason for its appearance in indirect discourse,[85] is to neglect the testimony of early Latin in passages involving indirect discourse,[86] and the testimony of early Latin and early Greek alike in regard to the original force of the subjunctive.

[85] Lindsay envisages this state of affairs as already prevailing in early Latin. Note his comment (65): "The use of the Ind. makes the statement more a definite statement of actual fact, the use of the Subj. makes it more indefinite, more dependent on external agency.   The distinction is most clearly seen in Oratio Obliqua, where the Plautine and the classical usage scarcely differ, e.g. *Bacch.* 735." Schlicher goes further, because he starts earlier, than Lindsay.   He views the indicative as the original mood, and would trace its supplanting by the subjunctive as due to the emergence of the civilized man from the savage.   Thus he writes (*AJP* 26.70–1): "if the power and habit of discriminating between ideas as to their truthfulness, is one which is slowly acquired with the growth of the mind, then the primitive attitude toward ideas expressed by others cannot have been essentially different from that toward ideas of native production. . . .   The difference in meaning which exists between the indicative and the subjunctive as moods of indirect quotation, is precisely this, that the subjunctive expresses the idea which is felt to be foreign, as opposed to the idea which one is able to treat as one's own, and which is, by way of distinction, expressed by the indicative.   And if the realization that another's ideas are something apart and different from one's own, is a later development, the use of the special mood which reflects the mental attitude toward these foreign ideas must also be of later origin."   Even in the realm of pure speculation, I would question this, for, though it is clearly characteristic of the somewhat inexperienced and unskilled writer to mix direct and indirect discourse (as Hittite amply testifies), I would certainly doubt that any creature sufficiently developed to use language at all could fail to distinguish between his own beliefs or desires and those of some one else.   And in any case the Romans using indirect discourse were eons removed from such a creature!

[86] Where the indicative seems to indicate a greater degree of reality or factuality than the subjunctive, this is, I am sure, due primarily to the fact that it indicates a greater degree of vividness — as exemplified by the two types of future condition. Cf. once more note 30 above.